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Abstract
We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1)
those resembling typical signalling games, in which a single agent represents each player,
allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each
player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private
information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model, relies on a
parameter, ρ, which denotes the correlation between two agents’ private information —
i.e., the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences.
The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where ρ = 0 and
ρ = 1, respectively. The model also allows 0 < ρ < 1, a class of games which have not
yet been considered. We apply the model to crisis bargaining and demonstrate how to
estimate ρ, as well as parameters associated with utilities.
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1 Introduction
How do state leaders, members of Congress, voters, or consumers know what their future
preferences will be? In most applications of game theory to political behavior, researchers
generally assume that decision makers know their own future preferences with complete
certainty. While this assumption seems reasonable in some cases (e.g., when a small number
of decisions will be made over a short period of time), there may be other situations where it
is implausible (e.g., when decisions will be made over a long period of time). In this paper,
we examine future preferences and signaling in the context of statistical games. We develop
a new approach (a Correlated Agent Model) that generalizes two major classes of models
with private information. We demonstrate how to conduct statistical estimation using this
new approach and apply these techniques to international crisis bargaining.
Current statistical models for crisis bargaining entail either traditional game-theoretic
assumptions (Lewis and Schultz 2003; Wand 2006; Whang 2010b; Whang, McLean and
Kubserski 2013) or “independent agent” assumptions(Signorino 2003; Leblang 2003; Sig-
norino and Tarar 2006; Gent 2007; Bas, Signorino and Walker 2008; McLean and Whang
2010; Carter 2010; Bas 2012). These approaches diﬀer in what they assume about players’
uncertainty concerning their own preferences. Traditional game-theoretic models assume
that each player completely knows at every point in the game how much she will value the
outcomes in the model, no matter how far in the future those outcomes are. In contrast,
many recent stochastic games (e.g., McKelvey & Palfrey’s Quantal Response Equilibrium
(McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998) and Signorino’s Nash-based strategic probit models (Sig-
norino 1999, 2003)) take an independent agent approach. Here, each player is represented
by a diﬀerent agent for each information set. A player’s agents share the same average util-
ity for outcomes, but have diﬀerent private components that are unobserved by her fellow
agents. This assumption makes intuitive sense when moves are temporally distant – e.g., I
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may not know exactly how, at some point in the future, I will value a given outcome. This
assumption is also realistic when we have a reason to expect changes in a player’s agents –
i.e., when we have reason to believe that a current agent and a successor agent will diﬀerently
value a given outcome. Finally, it is reasonable to have the independent agent assumption
when there are unexpected events or exogenous shocks in the course of the game that alter
the utility evaluation of players.
Crucially, these two models lead to distinct implications regarding the ability of players to
signal their resolve and learn from the actions of opponent players. The traditional Bayesian
models allow each player to update his/her initial beliefs in the game. Since players know
their own private information before the game begins, the informed player is capable of
signaling his/her true ‘type’ and the other players fully adjust their prior assessment of their
opponent’s type and actions accordingly. The independent agent assumption, on the other
hand, implies that players do not learn from each other’s moves, since private information
for each agent is unknown to, and independent of, that player’s other agents farther down
the tree.
In many important contexts – e.g., international conﬂicts involving territorial disputes,
economic sanctions, or military interventions – the extent to which actors have correct un-
derstanding of their own payoﬀs down the game tree remains an empirical question. Rather
than pitting these approaches against each other as the only two options, and as mutually
exclusive options, we develop a more general approach — the Correlated Agent Model —
that contains each as a special case and allows us to estimate the extent to which actors
know their future preferences.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we set up a the-
oretical model that generalizes both the traditional Bayesian model and the independent
agent model. Following that, we derive equilibrium probabilities and develop a maximum
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likelihood estimator based on this more general model. We then present an application of
our statistical model to international crisis bargaining, using data from Lewis and Schultz
(2005).
2 Future Preferences and Correlated Agents
Game-theoretic models of signaling have been used extensively in the ﬁeld of international
relations. Whether the topic is crisis bargaining (Morrow 1989; Ramsay 2004), deterrence
(Powell 1990; Fearon 2002), crisis escalation and inter-state conﬂict (Fearon 1997; Slantchev
2005), the role of domestic politics in foreign policy choices (Fearon 1994a; Mo 1995; Schultz
1998), terrorism (Overgaard 1994; Arce and Sandler 2010), or economic sanctions (Martin
1993; Drezner 1998), scholars have employed signaling models to develop theories regarding
the role uncertainty plays in strategic interactions, and what tools and mechanisms are
available for actors to reduce this uncertainty or to exploit it.
A very simple but functional version of a game involving signaling and belief updating
is presented in Figure 1. Due to the simplicity of this model and its ability to fully capture
the essence of signaling and belief updating, discrete-choice models with the same or very
similar game structures have been used extensively in the literature (Fearon 1994b; Smith
1999; Schwebach 2000; Schultz 2001; Fearon 2002; Lewis and Schultz 2003; Lacy and Niou
2004; Lewis and Schultz 2005; Kurizaki 2007; Esarey, Mukherjee and Moore 2008; Fey and
Ramsay 2010). Due to these desirable properties, we will also use this model to develop the
statistical estimator in the next section.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The game in Figure 1 (a) represents a simple interaction between two players, A and B.
There are three decision nodes and four possible outcomes. Each player’s utility for a given
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outcome has two components: an observable component that is visible to both players, and
a private information component that is only revealed to the player herself. Accordingly,
Player A’s utility for outcome k is written as Uk + υk, where Uk represents the observable
component and υk the private component. Similarly, Player B’s utility for outcome k is
written as Vk + νk. We assume that υk and νk follow probability distributions f(υ) and g(ν)
respectively.
The game proceeds as follows: Nature moves ﬁrst, and draws υk and νk from their
corresponding distributions and selectively reveals them to A and B. Then Player A moves,
choosing between actions a1 and a2. If a1 is chosen, the game ends with Outcome 1.
1 If a2
is chosen, then Player B chooses between a3 and a4. If B chooses a3, the game ends with
Outcome 3. If a4 is chosen, then Player A moves again, choosing between a5 and a6. a5 ends
the game with Outcome 5, and a6 results in Outcome 6.
This is a traditional two-player Bayesian game with two-sided incomplete information.
We call this game the Single Agent Model (SAM) as A moves twice in the game and possesses
perfect information about her utilities in both stages. Based on an appropriately speciﬁed set
of utilities {U, V} and the probability distributions f(υ) and g(ν), we can solve this game
for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). For the purpose of developing the statistical estimator
later in the paper, we are especially interested in players’ probabilities of choosing each action
{p1, p2, . . . , p6}, and the probability distribution of outcomes that these probabilities imply.
We will now consider the two-agent version of the same game, shown in Figure 1 (b).
This is much like the game in Figure 1 (a), except now Player A is represented by two agents,
A1 and A2, who share the same observable utility Uk for an outcome k, while at the same
time each agent’s private component is not directly observable to the other agent.2 We will
denote the private components of A1 by υk as above, and A2’s private components by πk.
Like the private information components of A1 and B’s outcome utilities, πk is assumed
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to follow a continuous probability distribution, which we assume to be a standard Normal
distribution.
One can think of A1 and A2 as literally two separate agents for Player A – e.g., diﬀerent
decision-making incarnations of A that emerge in the course of the game. Alternatively, one
could think of this as Player A making decisions over a somewhat more extended period of
time — where she has a sense at the ﬁrst node what her utility is likely to be at the last
node, but realizes that it may change slightly by that point.
In the typical agent speciﬁcation, which we will refer to as the Independent Agent Model
(IAM), the private components υk and πk are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed. In other words, A1 and B have the same amount of uncertainty about A2’s choice
at the end of the game. In this formulation, it is helpful to think of the game as consisting
of three diﬀerent players, two of which (A1 and A2) share the same observable utilities for
outcomes. Therefore, once A1 moves, B learns nothing about A’s private information and
what A2 is likely to do at the last node. In this game, there is no belief updating by any
player. For A1, knowing her own outcome payoﬀs does not give any information about A2’s
payoﬀs because of the independence of private components. There is no belief updating on
the part of B either, because A1’s choice in the game does not give any information about
A2’s likely choice.
IAM and SAM are limit cases of a more general model. Suppose we maintain the con-
struct of agents A1 and A2, but now assume that cor(υk, πk) = ρ = 0 for outcomes 5 and 6.3
In contrast to IAM, in this case, B may learn something about A2’s private information and
what A2 is likely to do by observing A1’s choice, because of the non-zero correlation between
the private information components of A1 and A2’s outcome payoﬀs. We refer to this more
general model as the Correlated Agent Model (CAM). IAM and SAM, with A moving twice
in the game, can now be seen as special cases of CAM. IAM corresponds to ρ = 0, while
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SAM represents the case ρ = 1. To ﬁnd the equilibrium of this model, we need to take into
account the prior and posterior information A1 and B have about the distribution of πk.
The following section derives the PBE for this model by calculating the prior and posterior
probabilities that A1 and B assign to A2’s choice in the game.
2.1 Correlated Agent Model
Based on the setup of the model, we solve for the PBE of the game, which requires that
players’ strategies are sequentially rational given their beliefs, and their beliefs are derived
from the equilibrium strategies using the Bayes’ Rule whenever possible.
We ﬁrst start with A2’s decision. In equilibrium, A2 chooses a6 if and only if it gives her
a higher expected utility than a5. In other words,
U6 + π6 ≥ U5 + π5 (1)
If we go up one decision node, B chooses a4 in equilibrium if and only if it gives her a better
expected payoﬀ. Since B has uncertainty about what A2 will do if B chooses a4, he needs
to calculate A2’s probability of choosing a6 (p6) and a5 (p5) and weight his outcome utilities
V6 + ν6 and V5 + ν5 accordingly. In other words, B chooses a4 whenever
(
1− pB6
)
(V5 + ν5) + p
B
6 (V6 + ν6) ≥ V3 + ν3 (2)
where pB6 represents B’s estimate of A2’s action probability after observing a2 by A1. Finally,
in equilibrium, A1 compares her expected payoﬀs from a1 and a2 (right and left-hand sides
of inequality 3 below). Because of her uncertainty about B’s and A2’s outcome payoﬀs,
A1 needs to estimate their action probabilities and use these estimated probabilities in her
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utility comparison. More formally, A1 chooses a2 if and only if
(1− p4) (U3 + υ3) + p4
(
1− pA16
)
(U5 + υ5) + p4p
A1
6 (U6 + υ6) ≥ U1 + υ1 (3)
where p4 represents A1’s prediction of B’s probability of choosing a4. Similarly, p
A1
6 represents
A1’s estimate of A2’s probability of choosing a6. Equilibrium conditions 1-3 satisfy the
sequential rationality requirement of PBE given players’ beliefs. We now need to make sure
the beliefs are consistent with the strategies using the Bayes’ Rule.
Note that in this game there are three diﬀerent estimates for A2’s probability of choosing
a6. The ﬁrst, denoted by p6, is based on A1 and B’s prior beliefs about the probability
distribution of A2’s private information components πi before any player makes a move. By
the assumptions of the game, this prior distribution is Normal(0,1). After Nature reveals
A1’s private information components υi to A1, knowing υi gives A1 information about πi,
due to the correlation ρ between the two. A1’s updated estimate for p6 is denoted by p
A1
6 .
Since πi and νi are not correlated, knowing his own private information components does
not give B any more information about A2 choice than that is already summarized by the
prior distribution of πi. However, B updates his prior belief after observing A1’s action,
as A1’s action implicitly conveys information about the more and less likely values for A2’s
private payoﬀs. This posterior probability estimate B calculates after observing A1’s choice
is denoted by pB6 .
As derivations in the Appendix show, pA16 and p
B
6 will usually take diﬀerent values. This
is because A1 possesses more information than B about A2’s choice due to the correlation
between A1 and A2’s private information components. After Nature reveals A1’s private
information components υi to A1, A1 uses this information to make more accurate inferences
about A2’s action probability. B, on the other hand, can only update his prior estimate of
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A2’s choice probability indirectly by observing A1’s action.
For ease of presentation, we deﬁne here the following three latent variables that capture
A1’s, B’s, and A2’s choices:
YA1 = (1− p4) (U3 + υ3) + p4
(
1− pA16
)
(U5 + υ5) + p4p
A1
6 (U6 + υ6)− U1 − υ1 (4)
YB =
(
1− pB6
)
(V5 + ν5) + p
B
6 (V6 + ν6)− V3 − ν3 (5)
YA2 = U6 − U5 + π6 − π5 (6)
Note that in equilibrium, A1 chooses a2 if and only if YA1 ≥ 0. Similarly, B chooses a4 if and
only if YB ≥ 0, and A2 chooses a6 if and only if YA2 ≥ 0. Deﬁned this way, Yi are random
variables as they are functions of Normally distributed private information components of
each player. Proposition 1 below deﬁnes the relevant probabilities that characterize the PBE.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of CAM is characterized by the following probabilities:
p6 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0) (7)
pA16 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 | υ5, υ6) (8)
pB6 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 | YA1 ≥ 0) (9)
p4 = Pr (YB ≥ 0 | YA1 ≥ 0) (10)
p2 = Pr (YA1 ≥ 0 | YA1 ≥ 0;YB ≥ 0) (11)
where p6 represents A1’s and B’s prior estimates, and p
A1
6 and p
B
6 their posterior estimates
respectively, of A2’s probability of choosing a6. p2 and p4 represent A1’s probability of choosing
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a2, and B’s probability of choosing a4, respectively. The exact probabilities are as follows:
p6 = Φ
(
U6 − U5√
2
)
(12)
pA16 = Φ
(
U6 − U5 + ρ√
2− 2ρ2
)
(13)
pB6 =
E
⎡
⎣Φ(U6−U5+ρ√
2−2ρ2
)
Φ
⎛
⎝ (1−p4)U3+p4[(1−p¯A16 )U5+p¯A16 U6]−U1+ p4[2p¯A16 −1]2√
(1−p4)2+ p
2
4
2
+1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
p2
(14)
p4 = Φ
⎛
⎝(1− pB6 )V5 + pB6 V6 − V3√
(1− pB6 )2 + (pB6 )2 + 1
⎞
⎠ (15)
p2 = E
⎡
⎣Φ
⎛
⎝(1− p4)U3 + p4 [(1− p¯A16 )U5 + p¯A16 U6]− U1 + p4[2p¯
A1
6 −1]
2√
(1− p4)2 + p
2
4
2
+ 1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ (16)
where  = υ6 − υ5 is a (normally distributed) random variable and E is the expectation
operator for .
Proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. The following two claims establish that IAM
and SAM are special cases of CAM when ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, respectively, and are proved in
the Appendix.
Claim 1 When ρ = 0, the Correlated Agent Model reduces to the Independent Agent Model
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with the following action probabilities:
p6 = p
B
6 = p
A1
6 = Φ
(
U6 − U5√
2
)
(17)
p4 = Φ
(
pB6 V6 + (1− pB6 )V5 − V3√
1 + (pB6 )
2 + (1− pB6 )2
)
(18)
p2 = Φ
⎛
⎝(1− p4)U3 + p4 [(1− pA16 )U5 + pA16 U6]− U1√
(1− p4)2 + p24
(
1− pA16
)2
+ p24
(
pA16
)2
+ 1
⎞
⎠ (19)
Claim 2 When ρ = 1, the Correlated Agent Model reduces to the Single Agent Model with
the following action probabilities:
p4 = Φ
(
pB6 V6 + (1− pB6 )V5 − V3√
1 + (pB6 )
2 + (1− pB6 )2
)
(20)
p2 = 1− Φ2
[
U1 − (1− p4)U3 − p4U5√
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
,
U1 − (1− p4)U3 − p4U6√
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
,
1 + (1− p4)2
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
]
(21)
pB6 = Φ2
[
U6 − U5√
2
,
p4U6 − U1 + (1− p4)U3√
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
,
p4√
2(1 + (1− p4)2 + p24)
]
/p2 (22)
Before using CAM for empirical analysis, we need to know that it satisﬁes certain sta-
tistical properties. In the Appendix, we conduct two sets of Monte Carlo (MC) experiments
to establish the unbiasedness and consistency of CAM. For this purpose, we ﬁrst gener-
ated simulated samples for a variety of outcome utility and correlation values, and for each
conﬁguration, we approximated the sampling distribution of CAM estimation parameters.
Our results suggest that CAM provides unbiased estimates, and the standard errors of the
estimates approach zero as the sample size increases, indicating consistency. The second
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MC experiment provides a comparison of CAM, SAM, and IAM in a variety of situations
ranging from very low to very high correlation values, and aims to show that, overall, CAM
performs better than SAM and IAM. We ﬁnd that CAM is a superior approach to both when
the underlying correlation between the private information components of Player A’s two
agents is not known. Second, CAM also does at least as well as IAM when this correlation
is very close to zero, and as well as SAM when the correlation is close to one. For moderate
correlation values, CAM clearly outperforms both.
We now turn to an empirical application of the CAM estimator we just developed.
3 Empirical Application
In this section, as an empirical application of CAM, we analyze factors that aﬀect interstate
crisis initiation and escalation, using data from Lewis and Schultz (2005). Lewis and Schultz
(2005) analyze the factors that aﬀect a state leader’s decision to initiate an international
crisis and escalate it militarily. In their analysis, they employ a fully structural statistical
model using a traditional Bayesian updating game that assumes ρ = 1, resembling SAM in
ways discussed above. Figure 2 displays the extensive form of the crisis bargaining game that
forms the basis of the coding of the dependent variable – outcome of the crisis interaction
– in their analysis. State A ﬁrst decides either to challenge the status quo with an explicit
threat of using force in the case of the opponent state’s resistance, or to stay with the status
quo (Status Quo: SQ). Upon A’s challenge, State B decides either to make a concession
(Acquiescence: ACQ) or to resist the demand of A. If B resists, A has a ﬁnal choice of either
backing down from the initial challenge (Back Down: BD) or ﬁghting (Stand Firm: SF).
There are four mutually exclusive outcomes: SQ, ACQ, BD, and SF, and corresponding
utilities of A and B: SQA, ACQA, BDA, and SFA for A and SQB, ACQB, BDB, and SFB
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for B. [Figure 2 about here.]
[Table 1 about here.]
The data consist of 93 dyadic crisis cases from the period 1919 to 1931, comprising both
Militarized Interstate Dispute data (MID) and International Conﬂict Behavior data (ICB).
The number of observations is 2187 with the addition of SQ cases. The distribution of
crisis outcomes is SQ = 2094, ACQ = 44, BD = 12, and SF = 37 observations. Table 1
shows the variables and measures used in our empirical analysis, and their sources. To
brieﬂy summarize the model speciﬁcation in general terms, State A’s SQ utility is associated
with the maximum number of years since State 1 or 2 joined the international system after
WWI (measured by MaxAge). ACQ utilities of A and B are modeled by three variables: the
similarity of the two states’ strategic interests (Alliance), domestic stability in B (CivilWarB),
and whether the two states share a common land border or are separated by less than 150
miles of water (Contiguous). Following the democratic peace literature, A’s democracy level
(DemocracyA) is included in the BD utility of A. Three covariates are included in A’s and B’s
SF utilities. SFA is related to the democracy score of A (DemocracyA), the relative capability
ratio of A to B (CapShareA), and the economic development level of A (DevelopA), while SFB
is associated with capability ratio, democracy, and economic development of B (CapShareA,
DemocracyB, and DevelopB). All the variables are included in their corresponding utilities
using a linear functional form. For instance, the observable component of A’s SQ utility can
be expressed as U(A, SQ) = β0 + β1MaxAge, where βˆ0 and βˆ1 are estimated by the model.
Identiﬁcation is an important concern here because the amount of information in the data
(i.e., four mutually exclusive outcomes) is less than the number of parameters to estimate
(i.e., theoretically eight utilities). An obvious way to address this problem is to assume that
each utility is a function of regressors and thereby to increase variation in the data. While we
enhance the model’s ability to distinguish outcomes with explanatory variables as displayed
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in Table 1, we also follow suggestions made in the Appendix of Lewis and Schultz (2003). In
particular, we use normalization of the utilities by addition and multiplication while keeping
them intact with optimal choices drawn from the equilibrium probabilities. We make an
assumption regarding State A’s utilities such that the constant terms of SQA and BDB are
equal to zero. Moreover, no regressor is included in all utilities of any state. Finally, SQB
is not estimated because it is not considered in equilibrium calculation. There is no loss of
generality as a result of these restrictions.4
CAM aims to improve SAM (e.g., Lewis and Schultz 2003) and IAM (e.g., Signorino 1999,
2003) by parameterizing ρ. In the data analysis, ρ is deﬁned as the correlation between the
private information components of State A’s two agents in the ﬁrst and third decision nodes.
In a SAM model, as in Lewis and Schultz (2003, 2005), State A knows her SF and BD payoﬀs
perfectly at any point in the game. In other words, in our model’s terms, ρ is assumed to be
one. The primary purpose of our estimation of CAM here is to ﬁnd out if this assumption
of SAM is too restrictive in analyzing international crisis bargaining. In order to facilitate a
comparison between SAM and CAM, we borrow Lewis and Schultz’s main speciﬁcation for
the utilities and add ρ as an additional parameter to be estimated. As noted previously, as ρ
approaches zero the data-generating process approximates IAM where no meaningful belief
updating occurs, while as ρ approaches one, the data generating-process behind international
crisis bargaining follows SAM, which permits signaling and belief updating.
We model ρ as a link function of regressors such that
ρ =
exp(Xγ)− 1
exp(Xγ) + 1
, (23)
where γ is a vector of coeﬃcients of the regressors X. This way, ρ is well bounded between -1
and 1. We select two regressors, the log of A’s total population (PopulationA) and A’s level
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of democracy (DemocracyA). When we suppose, for instance, that the correlation between
the private information components of A’s agents is systematically associated with the level
of A’s total population, ρ becomes
ρ =
exp(γ0 + γ1PopulationA)− 1
exp(γ0 + γ1PopulationA) + 1
(24)
and we estimate γˆ0 and γˆ1. Then, the coeﬃcient of PopulationA helps us infer how much
State A is certain about her own preference over crisis bargaining outcomes down the game
tree. We choose the population and democracy of the challenger state A to understand ρ
because they are good proxies to characterize traditional military power and international
crisis management in the interwar period.5 It is reasonable to hypothesize that, if State A
has a large population, the degree of uncertainty between A1 and A2 is likely to decline and,
hence, the private terms of two agents should be more correlated, compared with the cases
with small population challengers6. This reasoning leads us to expect a positive coeﬃcient
for the population variable. On the other hand, DemocracyA is expected to have a negative
eﬀect on ρ because elected oﬃcials responsible for foreign policies are unlikely to share
identical preferences in a democratic country where leadership changes on a regular basis.
DemocracyA and DemocracyB are also included in each state’s Stand Firm utilities to control
for the eﬀect of regime type on states’ crisis preferences. We also include another indicator
of states’ power in their utilities, which is the state’s share of military capabilities in the
particular dyad (CapShareA).
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[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
The estimation ﬁndings are presented in Tables 2 - 3.8 The ﬁrst, second and third
columns denote the outcomes, utilities, and regressors assigned to the utilities, followed by
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the estimation results, coeﬃcients and standard errors of SAM (Lewis and Schultz 2005).9
CAM1 results in the sixth and seventh columns use the same data and utility speciﬁcations
of SAM except that the estimation model is now the correlated agent model where ρ is a
constant term. In CAM2, ρ is assumed to be a function of PopulationA, while CAM3 results
use PopulationA and DemocracyA.
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The ﬁndings of CAM1, CAM2 and CAM3 conﬁrm that most of the coeﬃcients have the
same signs as those from SAM. First, the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of MaxAge im-
plies that younger states mostly created in the wake of WWI are more likely to be revisionist
challengers. Second, the negative and signiﬁcant DemocracyA and constant term (except for
CAM2) of BDA implies that audience costs exist in that A is signiﬁcantly worse oﬀ after
backing down than after maintaining the status quo. Audience costs also increase, or the
probability of BDA decreases, if A is democratic. Third, the positive CapShareA and nega-
tive DemocracyA coeﬃcients imply that A’s utility SFA in the SF outcome increases as A’s
military advantage over B increases, and as A is less democratic. All three CAM results show
that DevelopA is statistically insigniﬁcant in contrast to SAM results. All three variables
and the constant term in SFB fail to pass conventional criteria for statistical signiﬁcance.
Fourth, while SAM has no signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in ACQ, whether A or B, CAM1 ﬁnds some
of them signiﬁcant at a 10% signiﬁcance level. The negative coeﬃcient of Alliance and the
positive coeﬃcient for CivilWarB imply that A’s ACQ payoﬀ, ACQA, increases as A and B
have less similarity in their alliance portfolios, and as B is involved in a civil war. Moreover,
the positive coeﬃcient of Alliance implies that B’s ACQ payoﬀ, ACQB, increases as A and
B have similar alliance portfolios. However, these variables lose signiﬁcance in CAM2 and
only Alliance in ACQA survives in CAM3.
In order to compare the two models, we ﬁrst conduct a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test
between SAM and CAM models to examine how much CAM models improve on the ﬁt of
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the SAM model. LR test is an appropriate choice here as SAM is a special case of CAM
with a restriction of ρ = 1. The test aims to ﬁnd out is relaxing this restriction results in
a signiﬁcant improvement in model ﬁt. The statistic follows a χ2 distribution with degrees
of freedom equal to the extra parameters used in modeling ρ. The LR statistic for the test
between SAM and CAM1 is −2 ∗ (−418.9+ 416.64) = 4.52 and the corresponding p-value is
0.0335. Thus, the results suggest that modeling ρ signiﬁcantly increases the model ﬁt and
our understanding of crisis bargaining. In addition, we compared the two approaches based
on their predictive performance. We ﬁnd that CAM clearly outperforms SAM in terms of
the percentage of Resist and Fight decisions correctly predicted (SAM: 59% for Fight, 56%
for Resist; CAM 76-79% for Fight, 56-62% for Resist). For the initial Challenge decision,
both models correctly predict approximately the same percentage of cases (96%).
Turning to the estimation of ρ, CAM1 estimates ρ as a constant term. While the es-
timated ρ fails to be signiﬁcant, this is not surprising. This speciﬁcation is only meant to
serve as a baseline, as estimating ρ as a constant term supposes that all challenger states
in the data have on average the same level of information about their future preferences,
which is unrealistic. To capture the potential variations across challenger states in the level
of correlation between the two agents’ private information, CAM2 and CAM3 incorporate
PopulationA and DemocracyA into the ρ speciﬁcation. CAM2 provides a positive and signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient of A’s level of total population, PopulationA (p-value = 0.0540). This positive
association implies that the correlation between private information of A1 and A2 increases
as A’s total population increases. When we plug in the average value of PopulationA while
all other variables are held constant at their mean values, the predicted value of ρ is only
0.26. However, the ρ prediction increases up to 0.99 at the maximum PopulationA value.
In the interwar period, there is no doubt that population was one of the most important
components of what is often called “hard power.” It stands to reason that the sheer size of a
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country’s manpower should be directly related to its economic output and military resources.
Therefore, a challenger state with a larger population should have better knowledge of what
she will prefer far down the game tree than a challenger with a smaller population. When
DemocracyA is added to the CAM2 speciﬁcation, CAM3 also produces similar results. In
particular, PopulationA remains robust with a positive direction. The positive coeﬃcient of
DemocracyA implies that as State A is democratic, the correlation of stochastic components
of SF utilities between its agents increases. While this does not seem to be consistent with
our expectation, it fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 displays the eﬀect of ρ on states’ predicted action probabilities, the predicted
probability of outcomes, and the amount of belief updating in international crises. We plot
the probability that State B resists upon receiving a challenge from State A (Pr(Resist):
solid line) and the probability that a ﬁnal outcome of the crisis is ACQ (Pr(ACQ): dotted
line) as a function of PopulationA. Remaining variables are set to their mean values. We
select the estimates of CAM2 instead of those of CAM3 as DemocracyA also appears in SF
and BD outcome utilities. Because the democracy variable is included both in ρ and other
utilities in CAM3, it is diﬃcult to separate out the eﬀect of ρ on the choice and action
probabilities. The x-axis of Figure 3 display values within two standard deviations away
from the mean of PopulationA.
Figure 3 shows that as PopulationA increases, Pr(Resist) decreases and, hence, Pr(ACQ)
increases. As the log of State A’s total population increases from 5.41 (minimum) to 13.15
(maximum), the probability that State B opts for resistance upon a challenge decreases
on average by 11%, which in turn results in a decrease of 9% in the probability that the
ACQ outcome is reached. From Table 3, recall that the population of State A is positively
associated with ρ. Thus, we can interpret that ρ is also negatively associated with Pr(Resist)
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and positively associated with Pr(ACQ).
The role of ρ is critical in understanding the ﬁndings in Figure 3 since the eﬀects of
PopulationA on state behavior works through ρ. This correlation parameter explains the
extent to which an informational mechanism is successfully established between State A and
B. We know that as the value of ρ increases, the crisis bargaining game gets closer to a
traditional Bayesian game, which involves knowledge being common to both State A and B.
As the agents of State A share their preferences and the crisis bargaining game reduces to
SAM, we expect that State B should take the act of challenge by the ﬁrst agent of State A
seriously. That is, State B should pay more attention to the message conveyed by State A’s
challenge. State B is more likely to update her initial assessment of State A’s resolve than
in the case in which the bargaining game reduces to the independent agent game.
State B’s prior belief, her estimate of the challenger’s probability of standing ﬁrm be-
fore B observes a challenge, is given by p6 or equation (4) in Proposition 1. Upon ob-
serving a challenge, State B adjusts her prior belief and forms a posterior belief, which is
the conditional probability that State A will stand ﬁrm given that State A challenges, i.e.,
Pr(Fight|Challenge) = pB6 or equation (6) in Proposition 1. The diﬀerence between the
posterior and prior, Pr(Fight|Challenge) − Pr(Fight) = pB6 − p6, measures the amount of
belief updating by B. As Figure 3 depicts, the amount of belief updating tends to increase
as PopulationA increases and, hence, ρ increases. We also see that the positive relationship
between ρ and belief updating inﬂuences State B’s choice at her decision-making node. State
B is less likely to resist because State B knows that there is less uncertainty between the two
agents of State A (high ρ). Compared with the opposite case of low ρ in which State B has
little to learn from the challenge, signaling can be eﬀective when the value of ρ is high. The
act of challenge is more likely to be credible in terms of revealing the challenger’s resolve.
This eﬀective informational mechanism can aﬀect state behavior, decreasing the probability
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of Resist and increasing the probability of ACQ. In sum, in this particular example we con-
sidered, the larger the population of State A, the larger the probability that State A achieves
concessions from B, because of more eﬀective signalling.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a statistical estimator that integrates two existing models: a
model that makes traditional Bayesian updating assumptions (Single Agent Model) and
a model with no belief updating (Independent Agent Model). As Lewis and Schultz (2003)
argued, one notable diﬀerence between the single and independent agent models is the extent
to which belief updating is allowed. Because the former model assumes that players have no
uncertainty over their own utilities while having uncertainty over their opponent’s utilities,
the informed mover has a chance to signal her type. In the independent agent model, on
the other hand, signaling is impossible simply because each agent of the player has private
information that is not observed by the fellow agents. Under these conditions, opponents
are unable to update their prior beliefs and infer the type of the ﬁrst player, because private
information components are independent from each other.
While the two models stem from distinct theoretical frameworks, their diﬀerences can
be summarized in terms of whether players have complete knowledge regarding their future
utilities in the game. Our Correlated Agent Model estimates the extent to which players
know their future preferences farther down the game tree. We do not assume, as is common
in traditional Bayesian signaling models, that players know all their future utilities before
the game begins. Rather, we estimate an additional parameter ρ that informs us about
the extent to which players know their future payoﬀs. Insofar as it makes no assumptions
regarding the value of ρ, the correlated agent model absorbs single agent models (where ρ =
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1) and independent agent models (where ρ = 0) into a single framework. Moreover, Monte
Carlo analyses demonstrate that the correlated agent model is unbiased and consistent, and
outperforms the other two models in a variety of situations with diﬀerent levels of correlation
between actors’ private information at diﬀerent points in time.
Finally, using our approach, we reanalyzed a recent study by Lewis and Schultz (2005) on
interstate crisis bargaining during the interwar period. While maintaining their speciﬁcation
for actors’ utilities from the outcomes of the crisis interaction, we estimated ρ as a measure
of a challenger state’s knowledge of her future preferences if the target state resists her
challenge. In doing so, we assumed that the extent of this knowledge is a function of the
state’s economic development and total population. Our ﬁndings show that these factors have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on how much a state knows about its future preferences: as a challenger
state has a larger size of its manpower, it tends to have a clearer picture of its preferences
over what to do if its target decides to resist a challenge.
Notes
1We reference each outcome by the subscript of the action that leads to it.
2The assumption that the two agents of Player A share the same observable utility is
not crucial and can be relaxed without signiﬁcantly changing any of the derivations. We
keep this assumption to facilitate a direct comparison of the three models we consider in this
paper.
3We assume that cor(υ5, π5) = cor(υ6, π6). Although a model with a more general cor-
relation structure can also be derived, we omit it here due to the additional complexity it
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introduces to the derivation of probabilities without providing new theoretical insights that
would justify the additional complexity. In addition, we do not consider correlations across
diﬀerent outcomes for a given player. For models with within-player correlation, see Whang
(2010a).
4We also de-mean the variables used in analysis to (1) make our speciﬁcation consistent
with that of Lewis and Schultz and (2) make it easier to interpret the results (e.g., the
constant terms will have intuitive meaning because they represent the average utility of
outcomes when all other variables are equal to their mean values).
5We also ran a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the correlation parameter using
alternative indicators for state power, which are not reported here. Our substantive ﬁndings
remain the same. These results are available upon request.
6If we view A1 and A2 as the representatives of the median position regarding the crisis
within state A, and if we assume that individual voters’ positions on the crisis issue can shift
randomly over time, the likelihood of resulting large shifts in the median voter’s position
(hence, the preferences of A2) over time will vary depending on the population size. In
particular, in larger populations, the median position will be more robust to random changes
and less likely to shift over time, and hence A1’s uncertainty about A2’s preferences will be
lower.
7In order to strengthen the identiﬁcation of our model and help with convergence, we do
not include the same measure of power in both the utilities and the correlation parameter.
PopulationA and CapShareA are highly correlated, supporting our assumption that they
are proxies for the same concept. Our substantive results do not change if we include the
same measure of power in both parameters, but our estimates become more fragile. These
results are available upon request.
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8Two things are worth noting at this point. First, we numerically veriﬁed whether there
are multiple equilibria in any of our estimation results. For all estimated utilities, we found a
unique solution. Second, Lewis and Schultz (2005, 20) give additional preference restrictions
such that “the constant associated with ACQA to be greater than zero (or SQA) and the
constant associated with ACQB to be less than zero (or BDB).” While this may be a
sensible assumption from a theoretical perspective, we do not assume such restrictions. It is
not appropriate to suppose a priori that the counter-intuitive situations will not occur with
positive probability because they should not occur theoretically. It would be more sensible
to leave room for such cases in a statistical model. For detailed discussion regarding the
assumption of preference ordering in fully structural statistical models, see Whang (2009).
9Although not reported here, we also estimated an IAM model. The ﬁt of IAM in our
sample was signiﬁcantly worse than CAM and SAM, and therefore we chose not to include
it here for space reasons. The results are available upon request.
10While space constraints prevent us from reporting these results, when we include only
DemocracyA to model ρ, DemocracyA is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, A1 and B’s prior estimate of A2’s choice probability, p6, is equal to
p6 = P (U6 + π6 ≥ U5 + π5) (25)
= P (π5 − π6 ≤ U6 − U5) (26)
= Φ
(
U6 − U5√
2
)
(27)
because πi ∼ N(0, 1).
To calculate p4 = Pr(YB ≥ 0), observe that YB is a linear function of three independent
normally distributed variables ν3, ν5, and ν6, plus a constant. Therefore, YB is also normally
distributed, with mean
(
1− pB6
)
V5 + p
B
6 V6 − V3 and variance
(
1− pB6
)2
+ (pB6 )
2 + 1. Hence,
p4 = Φ
⎛
⎝(1− pB6 )V5 + pB6 V6 − V3√
(1− pB6 )2 + (pB6 )2 + 1
⎞
⎠ (28)
The following proposition will be useful in deriving pA16 and p
B
6 :
11
Proposition 2 Let Z be a multivariate normal distribution and partition Z such that mean
and variance are deﬁned as follows.
Z =
⎛
⎜⎝ Z1
Z2
⎞
⎟⎠ ∼ N
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎜⎝μ1
μ2
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
⎛
⎜⎝V11 V12
V21 V22
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠ . (29)
27
Then, the conditional distribution of Z1 given Z2 is N(μ1|2, V1|2) where
μ1|2 = μ1 + V12V −122 (Z2 − μ2) (30)
V1|2 = V11 − V12V −122 V21. (31)
One way to calculate pA16 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 | υ5, υ6) is by deriving the conditional distribu-
tion Pr (YA2 | υ5, υ6).12 Using Proposition 2, we can calculate this conditional probability
distribution. To see why this is possible, observe that YA2 is a linear function of two inde-
pendent, normally distributed variables π5 and π6, and therefore it is distributed normally.
Since υ5 and υ6 are also normally distributed variables, Proposition 2 applies. Let
Z =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
YA2
υ5
υ6
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Note that Z is distributed as
Z =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
YA2
υ5
υ6
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∼ N
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
U6 − U5
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 −ρ ρ
−ρ 1 0
ρ 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (32)
From Proposition 2, we can calculate the mean and the variance of this conditional distri-
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bution as
E [YA2 | υ5, υ6] = U6 − U5 + (−ρ, ρ)
⎛
⎜⎝υ5
υ6
⎞
⎟⎠ (33)
= U6 − U5 + ρ (υ6 − υ5) (34)
V ar [YA2 | υ5, υ6] = 2− (−ρ, ρ)
⎛
⎜⎝−ρ
ρ
⎞
⎟⎠ (35)
= 2− 2ρ2 (36)
Hence,
pA16 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 | υ5, υ6)
= Φ
(
E [YA2 | υ5, υ6]√
V ar [YA2 | υ5, υ6]
)
= Φ
(
U6 − U5 + ρ (υ6 − υ5)√
2− 2ρ2
)
(37)
To ﬁnd p2, we need to ﬁnd Pr(YA1 ≥ 0). This is a bit more involved than ﬁnding
p4, because unlike YB, we cannot deﬁne YA1 as a linear function of independent normally
distributed random variables υ1, υ3, υ5, and υ6. This is due to the probability expression
pA16 that appears in YA1 as a non-linear function of υ5 and υ6. In particular, p
A1
6 is a function
of υ6 − υ5.
We instead calculate this probability without deriving the exact distribution of YA1 .
We use two short-cuts. First, note that we can express the probability of an event as the
expectation of the indicator variable for that event. In other words, if we deﬁne a random
variable IY as
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IY =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if YA1 ≥ 0
0 otherwise
Then, Pr(YA1 ≥ 0) becomes
Pr(YA1 ≥ 0) = E [IY ] (38)
Our second short-cut involves eliminating the υ6−υ5 term in pA16 that appears in Pr(YA1 ≥
0). We will do that by conditioning on υ6 − υ5. Intuitively, this means that if we knew
υ6 − υ5, then calculating Pr(YA1 ≥ 0) would no longer be a problem because YA1 would just
become a linear function of normally distributed independent variables υ1, υ3, υ5, and υ6.
To achieve this, we will use equality 38 and the Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE). For
ease of presentation, we deﬁne  = υ6 − υ5. Using LIE, we can rewrite the right-hand side of
equation 38 as
E [IY ] = E [E [IY | ]] (39)
Also, using the fact that the conditional probability of an event is equal to the conditional
expectation of the indicator variable of that event, we can replace the right-hand side with
the following:
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E [IY ] = E [E [IY | ]] (40)
= E [Pr (YA1 ≥ 0 | )] (41)
Note that if we knew  = υ6 − υ5, then YA1 would just become a linear function of
normally distributed independent variables. Call this variable Y ∗A1 to diﬀerentiate it from
YA1 . Y
∗
A1
is normally distributed with
E
[
Y ∗A1
]
= (1− p4)U3 + p4
(
1− p¯A16
)
U5 + p4p¯
A1
6 U6 − U1 (42)
V ar
[
Y ∗A1
]
= (1− p4)2 + p24
(
1− p¯A16
)2
+ p24(p¯
A1
6 )
2 + 1 (43)
We use p¯A16 instead of p
A1
6 to emphasize that p¯
A1
6 is just a constant when we know . We can
rewrite Equation 41 as
E [IY ] = E [Pr (YA1 ≥ 0 | )] (44)
= E
[
Pr
(
Y ∗A1 ≥ 0 | 
)]
(45)
Hence, within the expectation, we now have the probability of a normally distributed variable
conditional on another normally distributed variable. We can easily use Proposition 2 to
calculate this probability. Deﬁne
Z∗ =
⎛
⎜⎝Y ∗A1

⎞
⎟⎠ (46)
31
Note that Z∗ is distributed as
N
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎝(1− p4)U3 + p4
(
1− p¯A16
)
U5 + p4p¯
A1
6 U6 − U1
0
⎞
⎠ ,
⎛
⎜⎝(1− p4)
2 + p24
(
1− p¯A16
)2
+ p24(p¯
A1
6 )
2 + 1 p4
(
2p¯A16 − 1
)
p4
(
2p¯A16 − 1
)
2
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠ (47)
From this bivariate normal distribution, we calculate the mean and the variance of the
conditional distribution speciﬁed within the expectation argument in Equation 45 as:
E
[
Y ∗A1 | 
]
= (1− p4)U3 + p4
[(
1− p¯A16
)
U5 + p¯
A1
6 U6
]− U1 + p4
[
2p¯A16 − 1
]

2
(48)
V ar
[
Y ∗A1 | 
]
= (1− p4)2 + p
2
4
2
+ 1. (49)
We can now easily calculate the probability within the expectation in Equation 45 as
Pr
(
Y ∗A1 ≥ 0 | 
)
= Φ
⎛
⎝(1− p4)U3 + p4 [(1− p¯A16 )U5 + p¯A16 U6]− U1 + p4[2p¯
A1
6 −1]
2√
(1− p4)2 + p
2
4
2
+ 1
⎞
⎠ (50)
Thus, ﬁnally, p2 is equal to
p2 = E [IY ] = E
⎡
⎣Φ
⎛
⎝(1− p4)U3 + p4 [(1− p¯A16 )U5 + p¯A16 U6]− U1 + p4[2p¯
A1
6 −1]
2√
(1− p4)2 + p
2
4
2
+ 1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ (51)
Finally, we calculate pB6 , the probability that Player A2 chooses action a6 given that
Player A2 has chosen action a2. Note that
pB6 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 | YA1 ≥ 0) (52)
=
Pr(YA2 ≥ 0, YA1 ≥ 0)
p2
. (53)
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To characterize Pr(YA2 ≥ 0, YA1 ≥ 0), we make the following claim:
Claim 3 Given , Y ∗A1 and YA2 are independent. That is,
Cov
[
Y ∗A1 , YA2 | 
]
= 0. (54)
Proof We already showed that Y ∗A1 , YA2 , and  are all normally distributed variables, as
they are linear functions of independent normally distributed variables. We can again use
Proposition 2 to derive the joint distribution of Y ∗A1 and YA2 conditional on .
We ﬁrst deﬁne a random vector Γ from a multivariate normal distribution:
Γ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Y ∗A1
YA2

⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (55)
Then, E [Γ] and V ar [Γ] are as follows:
E [Γ] =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
E
[
Y ∗A1
]
E [YA2 ]
E []
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (56)
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1− p4)U3 + p4
(
1− p¯A16
)
U5 + p4p¯
A1
6 U6 − U1
U6 − U5
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (57)
V ar [Γ] =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1− p4)2 + p24
(
1− p¯A16
)2
+ p24(p¯
A1
6 )
2 + 1 p4ρ
(
2p¯A16 − 1
)
p4
(
2p¯A16 − 1
)
p4ρ
(
2p¯A16 − 1
)
2 2ρ
p4
(
2p¯A16 − 1
)
2ρ 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠(58)
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From Proposition 2, we get the covariance of Y ∗A1 and YA2 given  as
Cov
[
Y ∗A1 , YA2 | 
]
= V ar [Γ]12 − V ar [Γ]13 V ar [Γ]32 /V ar [Γ]33 (59)
= p4ρ
(
2p¯A16 − 1
)− p4 (2p¯A16 − 1) 2ρ/2 (60)
= 0. (61)
Hence, given , Y ∗A1 and YA2 are independent.
We can now write Pr(YA2 ≥ 0, YA1 ≥ 0) as
Pr(YA2 ≥ 0, YA1 ≥ 0) = E [Pr(YA2 ≥ 0, YA1 ≥ 0 | )] (62)
= E
[
Pr(YA2 ≥ 0, Y ∗A1 ≥ 0 | )
]
(63)
= E
[
Pr(YA2 ≥ 0 | ) Pr(Y ∗A1 ≥ 0 | )
]
(64)
and pB6 as
pB6 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 | YA1 ≥ 0) (65)
=
Pr(YA2 ≥ 0, YA1 ≥ 0)
p2
(66)
=
E
[
Pr(YA2 ≥ 0 | ) Pr(Y ∗A1 ≥ 0 | )
]
p2
(67)
=
E
⎡
⎣Φ(U6−U5+ρ√
2−2ρ2
)
Φ
⎛
⎝ (1−p4)U3+p4[(1−p¯A16 )U5+p¯A16 U6]−U1+ p4[2p¯A16 −1]2√
(1−p4)2+ p
2
4
2
+1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
p2
(68)
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A.2 Proofs of Claims 1 and 2
A.2.1 Equivalence of CAM and IAM when ρ = 0.
First, observe that when ρ = 0, pA16 in equation 13 reduces to Φ(
U6−U5√
2
), which is equal
to the IAM probability p6 in equation 17. Second, observe that when ρ = 0, the ﬁrst Φ()
argument inside the expectation in equation 14 is no longer a function of  and therefore
can be taken out of the expectation. The remaining part of the expectation is equal to p2 in
equation 16, and p2 in the numerator and the denominator cancel each other out. Therefore,
p6 = p
B
6 = p
A1
6 when ρ = 0. Third, p4 in equation 15 as a function of p
B
6 reduces to p4 in
equation 18 as p6 = p
B
6 . Finally, in calculating p2 when ρ = 0, note that we no longer need
to condition on  = υ6 − υ5 and use the Law of Iterated Expectations, because YA1 is now a
linear function of independent normally distributed random variables and itself is normally
distributed. This results in the probability p2 as expressed in equation 19.
A.2.2 Equivalence of CAM and SAM when ρ = 1.
In this section, we show that CAM probabilities converge to SAM probabilities given in
Claim 2 when ρ → 1. Deﬁne an indicator function I6 that takes the value 1 when max{U6+
υ6, U5 + υ5} = U6 + υ6 and 0 otherwise. Thus, in the last node, A2 chooses a6 if and only
if I6 = 1. Also, since ρ = 1, deﬁne  = υ6 − υ5 = π6 − π5. Thus, when ρ = 1, pA6 in CAM
converges to I6.
Observe that, when ρ = 1, derivation of p4 follows the identical steps as in the more
general CAM case as deﬁned in equation 28. Moreover, A1 knows exactly what A2 will do
at the last decision node due to the perfect correlation. Thus, A1 chooses a2 if and only if
(1− p4)(U3 + υ3) + p4max{U6 + υ6, U5 + υ5} ≥ U1 + υ1 (69)
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Thus, one way to derive p2 is as follows:
p2 = Pr
(
max{U6 + υ6, U5 + υ5} ≥ U1 + υ1 − (1− p4)(U3 + υ3)
p4
)
(70)
= 1− Pr
(
U6 + υ6 <
U1 + υ1 − (1− p4)(U3 + υ3)
p4
∧ U5 + υ5 < U1 + υ1 − (1− p4)(U3 + υ3)
p4
)
(71)
= 1− Φ2
[
U1 − (1− p4)U3 − p4U5√
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
,
U1 − (1− p4)U3 − p4U6√
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
,
1 + (1− p4)2
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
]
(72)
Equivalently, we can calculate this probability by conditioning on  and then calculating the
conditional probability using Proposition 2:
p2 = E
[
Pr
(
max{U6 + υ6, U5 + υ5} ≥ U1 + υ1 − (1− p4)(U3 + υ3)
p4
| 
)]
(73)
= E
⎡
⎣Φ
⎛
⎝(1− p4)U3 + p4 [(1− I6)U5 + I6U6]− U1 + p4[2I6−1]2√
(1− p4)2 + p
2
4
2
+ 1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ (74)
which is also p2 for CAM when ρ = 1.
Finally, we can calculate pB6 as
pB6 = Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 | YA1 ≥ 0) (75)
=
Pr(YA2 ≥ 0 , YA1 ≥ 0)
p2
(76)
=
Pr(U6 + υ6 ≥ U5 + υ5 , (1− p4)(U3 + υ3) + p4max{U6 + υ6, U5 + υ5} ≥ U1 + υ1)
p2
(77)
= Φ2
[
U6 − U5√
2
,
p4U6 − U1 + (1− p4)U3√
p24 + 1 + (1− p4)2
,
p4√
2(1 + (1− p4)2 + p24)
]
/p2 (78)
Equivalently, we can calculate this probability by again conditioning on  and then calculating
the conditional probability Pr(YA2 ≥ 0 , YA1 ≥ 0 | ) using Proposition 2. Conditioning on
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 allows us to use Claim 3 to treat Pr(YA2 ≥ 0 | ) and Pr(YA1 ≥ 0 | ) as probabilities of
two independent events. Hence,
pB6 =
E [Pr (YA2 ≥ 0 , YA1 ≥ 0 | )]
p2
(79)
=
E [Pr(YA2 ≥ 0 | ) Pr(YA1 ≥ 0 | )]
p2
(80)
=
E
⎡
⎣I6Φ
⎛
⎝ (1−p4)U3+p4[(1−I6)U5+I6U6]−U1+ p4[2I6−1]2√
(1−p4)2+ p
2
4
2
+1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
p2
(81)
which is identical to pB6 for CAM when ρ = 1.
B Monte Carlo Analysis
B.1 MC Analysis 1: Consistency of CAM
In this section, we evaluate the unbiasedness and consistency of estimates provided by CAM.
In terms of specifying the outcome utilities for the analysis, we look at two scenarios. In the
ﬁrst scenario, we select the parameter values such that the amount of belief updating by B
about A2’s choice is expected to be minimal. In the second setting, we present a case where
we expect a larger amount of belief updating by B. Parameter values for the two scenarios
are presented in Table 4. What makes the second scenario permit more updating than the
ﬁrst? First, player A does not have much to gain by choosing a2 rather than a1 in the second
setting because UA,3, A’s payoﬀ when player B chooses a3, is only 0.5, while this value is
1 in the ﬁrst case. Second, the second scenario indicates that A incurs substantial losses
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when B chooses a4, because UA,5 and UA,6 are -4 and -5 respectively, whereas they are only
-0.5 and -1 in the ﬁrst setting. Third, the second speciﬁcation gives B a relatively strong
incentive to choose a4 because UB,5 is much higher in the second case (5) than the ﬁrst (1).
Consequently, the second scenario implies a situation where, on average, player A has less
incentive to choose a2 over a1 and player B has more incentive to choose a4 over a3. If player
A chooses a2, this implies that the private components of UA,1, UA,3, and UA,5 are likely to
be larger than expected a priori, and this causes Player B to update her beliefs by a larger
amount after observing a2.
[Table 4 about here.]
In addition to two conﬁgurations described above, we consider three correlation values
ρ ∈ {0, .5, .9} and four sample sizes N ∈ {250, 500, 1000, 5000}. For each parameter and
sample size combination, 1000 MC iterations are completed, which give us the approximate
sampling distributions of the CAM estimates.13
We estimate UA,1, UA,5, UA,6, UB,3, and ρ directly. The remaining three mean payoﬀs,
UA,3, UB,5, and UB,6, are assumed to be a linear combination of regressors:
UA,3 = XA,3βA,3 (82)
UB,5 = XB,5βB,5 (83)
UB,6 = XB,6βB,6, (84)
where XA,3, XB,5, and XB,6 are regressors randomly drawn from a standard normal
distribution. Thus, in each iteration of the MC analysis, we also estimate βˆA,3, βˆB,5, and
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βˆB,6.
Table 5 reports the mean coeﬃcient estimates. The top half of the table is for coeﬃcients
from the small updating scenario, and the bottom half is for a large updating case. Using
the same structure, Table 6 reports the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the estimated
coeﬃcients:
√
E(θˆ − θ)2, where θ denotes the true parameter value from the data generating
process, and θˆ is the CAM parameter estimate. RMSE is the square root of the mean squared
error (MSE). MSE of an estimate is the sum of the variance and the squared bias of that
estimate, and in that sense, smaller MSE and RMSE values indicate a more precise estimator.
We chose to report RMSE, because it has the advantage of being on the same scale as the
estimated parameter.
In both small and large updating settings, all coeﬃcients on average are estimated very
close to the true parameter values, and the accuracy of the estimates increases as the sample
size increases. For positive ρ, there seems to be a downward bias in small samples, which
disappears as the samples get larger. RMSE values also indicate that the precision of the
estimates get signiﬁcantly better as the sample size increases. RMSE values approach zero
as the samples get larger, which means that any potential bias in the estimates disappear,
and the variance of the estimates approach zero, indicating consistency.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
The MC analysis in this section has shown that CAM can be estimated in a variety of
parameter conﬁgurations and the estimates are unbiased and consistent. The analysis did not
determine, however, whether CAM has an advantage over SAM or IAM in providing correct
inferences. The next section provides such a comparison by evaluating the performances of
CAM, SAM, and IAM for diﬀerent correlation values.
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B.2 MC Analysis 2: Comparison of CAM, SAM, and IAM
When should CAM be chosen over SAM or IAM? Are there cases in which the latter two
should be preferred? This section provides an answer to these questions by comparing the
three estimators across diﬀerent correlation values. In this experiment, we set the parameter
values to UA,1 = 0, UA,5 = −4, UA,6 = −4.5, UB,3 = 0. The remaining three observable
payoﬀ components, UA,3, UB,5, and UB,6 are assumed, as in the previous section, to be a
linear combination of regressors:
UA,3 = XA,3βA,3 (85)
UB,5 = XB,5βB,5 (86)
UB,6 = XB,6βB,6, (87)
where XA,3, XB,5, and XB,6 are randomly drawn from a standard normal distribution.
We set βA,3 = 6, βB,5 = 4, and βB,6 = −6. We chose this parameter conﬁguration because
it permits signiﬁcant belief updating by B. In addition, we consider ρ ∈ {.05, .35, .65, .95}.
ρ = .05 represents a scenario where the data-generating process is closer to IAM, and when
ρ = .95, the process approximates SAM.
Figure 4 plots CAM equilibrium action probabilities p2, p4, and p
B
6 as a function of ρ,
based on the data-generating process values for the outcome utilities. As the plot makes
clear, the action probabilities are not linear and can be non-monotonic in ρ. More strikingly,
depending on the value of ρ, action probabilities can shift from being very close to zero
to .40, which makes correctly estimating ρ a very important factor for achieving unbiased
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inferences.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Based on each possible combination of parameters speciﬁed above, we generated 1000
diﬀerent samples of size N=10000. Having a larger sample size makes standard errors of the
estimated coeﬃcients smaller and makes it possible to focus mainly on the potential bias in
the estimates. In each of the 1000 samples generated, we estimated CAM, SAM, and IAM
to approximate the sampling distributions of the seven outcome utility parameter estimates.
CAM also included an additional parameter ρ to be estimated.
Table 7 presents the means of estimated parameters. As in the previous MC analysis,
CAM on average successfully captures all the parameter values. IAM, on the other hand,
only produces unbiased estimates when ρ is .05, but fails to do so for larger ρ. Similarly,
SAM fails to provide unbiased estimates for most of the coeﬃcient values, even when ρ = .95.
By themselves, the results presented in Table 7 do not provide enough information to
indicate CAM as a better choice over the other two estimators in terms of making inferences.
For one thing, the estimated coeﬃcients in IAM and SAM might be calculated on a diﬀerent
scale than the CAM estimates due to the diﬀerences in the variance-covariance structure.
Thus, it is possible that IAM and SAM coeﬃcients are not actually biased, but rather
scaled diﬀerently. Action and outcome probabilities do not suﬀer from this scaling issue.
Second, in empirical analyses, scholars are more often interested in the action or outcome
probability estimates than in the exact coeﬃcient estimates. Thus, if IAM and SAM provide
unbiased estimates of those probabilities for diﬀerent correlation values, the usefulness of
CAM would be limited. For these reasons, Table 8 compares the three estimators based
on the action probability estimates they produce for each player, and how closely these
estimates approximate the probabilities speciﬁed by the data-generating process (DGP).
The table provides the mean estimates for p2, p4, p
B
6 , and p6 as well as their RMSE values.
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In all four correlation values considered, CAM on average provides very accurate estimates
of the action probabilities. Except when ρ = .05, IAM provides biased probability estimates,
with bias as large as .25 when ρ = .65. Although not as biased as IAM, SAM also provides
biased probability estimates, with bias as much as .08 for p4 when ρ = .65. Perhaps more
interestingly, CAM does better than SAM even when ρ = .95. RMSE values also produce
similar implications. Given the large sample size, a large RMSE is mainly an indication of
bias rather than the variance of the estimator. Both IAM and SAM produce RMSE values
signiﬁcantly larger than CAM, except when ρ = .05 for IAM.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that, when the underlying correlation value is
unknown, CAM is clearly the appropriate choice of estimator over SAM or IAM, as it provides
unbiased utility and probability estimators without making a priori parametric assumptions
about ρ. Even when the correlation is suspected to be very small, or very close to one, CAM
fares at least as well as IAM and SAM. Given that it is very unlikely for a scholar to know
the approximate value of ρ without estimating it, our results suggest that CAM should be
preferred over the two other alternatives when the structure of the interaction indicates a
potential correlation between private components of the two actors.
[Table 7 about here.]
[Table 8 about here.]
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Variables Utilities Measures
MaxAge SQA The log of maximum age of the states in the dyad
Alliance ACQA and ACQB Tau-b score using alliances in the dyad’s region
CivilWarB ACQA and ACQB Dummy: was B involved in a civil war?
Contiguous ACQA and ACQB Dummy: do states share a land border or are
separated by less than 150 miles of water?
DemocracyA BDA, SFA, and ρ Dummy: was A democratic?
CapShareA SFA and SFB A’s share of capabilities in the dyad
DevelopA SFA The log of energy consumption per capita for A
DemocracyB SFB Dummy: was B democratic?
DevelopB SFB The log of energy consumption per capita for B
PopulationA ρ The log of total population of A
Table 1: Variables of Lewis and Schultz (2005) and CAM Application
The source of DemocracyA and DemocracyB is Polity IV data set and the rest of variables is
found from Correlates of War data set. All variables including PopulationA can be obtained
using EUGene (http://www.eugenesoftware.org).
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Estimation model: SAM CAM1
Est. SE Est. SE
SQ SQA Constant 0 0
MaxAge 0.12* (0.07) 0.23** (0.09)
ACQ ACQA Constant 1.77 (1.27) 0.76 (2.46)
Alliance -1.18 (0.89) -3.51* (2.06)
CivilWarB 1.07 (1.16) 5.43* (3.24)
Contiguous 0.72 (0.54) 1.33 (0.98)
ACQB Constant -1.41 (1.27) -1.19 (1.47)
Alliance 0.19 (0.89) 1.06* (0.59)
CivilWarB 0.15 (1.16) -0.25 (0.42)
Contiguous -0.09 (0.54) -0.08 (0.32)
BD BDA Constant -4.06** (1.08) -5.47** (1.92)
DemocracyA -0.76** (0.33) -1.20** (0.60)
BDB Constant 0 0
SF SFA Constant -3.62** (1.08) -4.94** (1.92) -
CapShareA 0.83** (0.31) 1.83** (0.88)
DemocracyA -0.79** (0.3) -1.35** (0.42)
DevelopA 0.02* (0.01) 0.06 (0.05)
SFB Constant -1.97 (1.96) -1.76 (2.10)
CapShareA 1.17 (0.77) 1.87 (1.39)
DemocracyB 0.1 (0.09) 0.28 (0.29)
DevelopB -0.02 (0.02) -0.05 (0.06)
ρ Constant 1.31 (4.06)
N 2187 2187
Log likelihood -418.90 -416.64
∗∗ = p < .05, ∗ = .05 < p < .1 (two-tailed)
Table 2: SAM and CAM Results on Lewis and Schultz (2005) Data Set (First Part)
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Estimation model: CAM2 CAM3
Est. SE Est. SE
SQ SQA Constant 0 0
MaxAge 0.38** (0.13) 0.55** (0.13)
ACQ ACQA Constant 3.56 (7.68) 3.09 (4.88)
Alliance -5.39 (4.12) -5.75* (3.28)
CivilWarB 4.31 (2.89) 7.27 (4.74)
Contiguous 4.16 (3.59) 3.01* (1.57)
ACQB Constant -4.32 (6.53) -4.38 (4.41)
Alliance 0.73 (0.64) 1.07 (0.71)
CivilWarB -0.10 (0.29) -0.56 (0.52)
Contiguous -0.58 (0.43) -0.34 (0.26)
BD BDA Constant -8.26 (7.20) -8.16 (5.52)
DemocracyA -1.77* (1.09) -1.59** (0.56)
BDB Constant 0 0
SF SFA Constant -7.42 (7.17) -7.60 (5.50)
CapShareA 1.13** (0.25) 0.31* (0.18)
DemocracyA -1.76* (0.99) -1.63** (0.54)
DevelopA 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
SFB Constant -5.90 (9.08) -6.23 (6.17)
CapShareA 2.69 (4.05) 1.17 (1.12)
DemocracyB 0.13 (0.24) 0.14 (0.20)
DevelopB 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
ρ Constant 0.53 (0.38) 0.78** (0.25)
PopulationA 0.51* (0.27) 1.15** (0.21)
DemocracyA 0.62 (0.46)
N 2187 2187
Log likelihood -399.81 -393.44
∗∗ = p < .05, ∗ = .05 < p < .1 (two-tailed)
Table 3: SAM and CAM Results on Lewis and Schultz (2005) Data Set (Second Part)
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Diﬀerence between Independent Agent
Model and Single Agent Model
Big Small
(Large Updating) (Small Updating)
UA,1 0 0
UA,3 0.5 1
UA,5 -4 -0.5
UA,6 -5 -1
UB,3 0 0
UB,5 5 1
UB,6 -1 -1
ρ 0, 0.5 and 0.9
Table 4: True Parameter Speciﬁcation
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Parameter Setting 1: Small Updating
A’s Utilities B’s Utilities
N UA,1 UA,3 UA,5 UA,6 UB,3 UB,5 UB,6 ρ
0 1 -1/2 -1 0 1 -1
250 0.033 1.041 -0.490 -0.972 0.014 1.058 -1.063 0.031 ρ = 0
500 0.015 1.032 -0.498 -0.981 0.036 1.030 -0.932 0.022
1000 0.011 1.009 -0.500 -0.981 0.027 1.015 -0.953 0.003
5000 0.003 1.005 -0.499 -0.996 0.011 1.003 -0.978 -0.006
250 -0.031 1.036 -0.507 -1.020 -0.034 1.053 -1.201 0.368 ρ = .5
500 -0.025 1.011 -0.502 -1.005 0.003 1.026 -1.040 0.393
1000 -0.017 1.003 -0.502 -1.006 0.006 1.014 -1.007 0.451
5000 0.003 1.003 -0.500 -1.000 0.004 1.006 -0.994 0.503
250 -0.031 1.031 -0.513 -1.006 -0.015 1.045 -1.115 0.766 ρ = .9
500 -0.031 1.009 -0.505 -1.008 -0.002 1.022 -1.045 0.796
1000 -0.015 1.011 -0.502 -1.002 -0.001 1.008 -1.003 0.843
5000 -0.003 1.002 -0.501 -1.001 0.001 1.002 -1.004 0.886
Parameter Setting 2: Large Updating
A’s Utilities B’s Utilities
N UA,1 UA,3 UA,5 UA,6 UB,3 UB,5 UB,6 ρ
0 1/2 -4 -5 0 5 -1
250 0.004 0.531 -4.057 -5.133 -0.086 6.915 -1.098 -0.062 ρ = 0
500 -0.005 0.515 -4.031 -5.077 -0.023 5.623 -1.028 -0.037
1000 0.001 0.509 -4.005 -5.020 -0.012 5.246 -1.005 -0.023
5000 0.002 0.503 -3.991 -4.990 0.004 5.061 -0.995 -0.008
250 0.005 0.543 -4.126 -5.085 -0.106 6.837 -1.111 0.236 ρ = .5
500 -0.005 0.516 -4.059 -5.004 -0.051 5.542 -1.045 0.312
1000 -0.004 0.501 -4.035 -4.992 -0.009 5.289 -1.010 0.394
5000 0.000 0.503 -4.006 -4.993 0.003 5.055 -0.996 0.474
25000 0.000 0.501 -3.999 -4.997 0.001 5.015 -0.998 0.497
250 -0.019 0.531 -4.214 -5.307 -0.121 6.675 -1.147 0.835 ρ = .9
500 -0.007 0.515 -4.135 -5.176 -0.041 5.592 -1.059 0.872
1000 -0.006 0.504 -4.058 -5.075 -0.016 5.266 -1.021 0.888
5000 0.002 0.502 -4.011 -5.017 -0.002 5.053 -1.005 0.898
Table 5: Mean Parameter Estimates from CAM
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Parameter Setting 1: Small Updating
A’s Utilities B’s Utilities
N UA,1 UA,3 UA,5 UA,6 UB,3 UB,5 UB,6 ρ
0 1 -1/2 -1 0 1 -1
250 0.226 0.260 0.168 0.258 0.488 0.246 1.261 0.588 ρ = 0
500 0.174 0.174 0.118 0.188 0.279 0.177 0.671 0.494
1000 0.134 0.118 0.084 0.127 0.201 0.118 0.483 0.398
5000 0.069 0.054 0.035 0.054 0.087 0.051 0.208 0.209
250 0.223 0.257 0.164 0.247 0.471 0.250 1.220 0.565 ρ = .5
500 0.175 0.164 0.115 0.171 0.299 0.161 0.758 0.460
1000 0.132 0.117 0.079 0.118 0.198 0.117 0.486 0.361
5000 0.063 0.055 0.034 0.052 0.090 0.052 0.217 0.172
250 0.205 0.268 0.168 0.245 0.517 0.245 1.481 0.373 ρ = .9
500 0.145 0.171 0.113 0.163 0.315 0.172 0.801 0.305
1000 0.102 0.127 0.082 0.117 0.215 0.118 0.528 0.186
5000 0.041 0.053 0.035 0.050 0.095 0.051 0.231 0.064
Parameter Setting 2: Large Updating
A’s Utilities B’s Utilities
N UA,1 UA,3 UA,5 UA,6 UB,3 UB,5 UB,6 ρ
0 1/2 -4 -5 0 5 -1
250 0.218 0.258 0.641 1.055 1.169 6.969 1.182 0.407 ρ = 0
500 0.154 0.167 0.431 0.717 0.377 1.792 0.391 0.338
1000 0.111 0.112 0.295 0.495 0.213 0.857 0.236 0.284
5000 0.047 0.050 0.128 0.220 0.088 0.350 0.100 0.157
250 0.224 0.243 0.651 0.951 1.054 6.729 1.070 0.523 ρ = .5
500 0.159 0.165 0.431 0.603 0.411 1.778 0.423 0.401
1000 0.107 0.113 0.302 0.417 0.214 0.988 0.225 0.269
5000 0.050 0.048 0.128 0.179 0.090 0.353 0.097 0.102
25000 0.022 0.022 0.064 0.089 0.040 0.154 0.044 0.038
250 0.237 0.262 0.707 1.113 0.904 5.941 0.930 0.198 ρ = .9
500 0.157 0.162 0.491 0.726 0.362 1.889 0.382 0.106
1000 0.112 0.112 0.314 0.461 0.216 0.988 0.225 0.038
5000 0.048 0.048 0.130 0.193 0.091 0.360 0.096 0.010
Table 6: Root Mean Squared Error of CAM Parameter Estimates
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A’s Utilities B’s Utilities
N UA,1 UA,3 UA,5 UA,6 UB,3 UB,5 UB,6 ρ
0 6 -4 -4.5 0 4 -6
CAM 0.002 6.016 -3.994 -4.498 0.003 4.012 -6.051 0.057 ρ = .05
SAM -0.002 5.322 -3.826 -4.288 0.069 3.891 -5.677
IAM -0.002 6.022 -4.024 -4.525 0.003 4.027 -6.037
CAM 0.001 6.012 -3.998 -4.504 0.002 4.005 -6.059 0.367 ρ = .35
SAM -0.023 5.385 -3.972 -4.502 0.058 3.912 -6.151
IAM -0.028 6.030 -4.190 -4.681 -0.001 4.097 -5.960
CAM 0.004 6.025 -4.008 -4.518 0.000 4.004 -6.067 0.657 ρ = .65
SAM -0.039 5.430 -4.051 -4.600 0.050 3.958 -6.281
IAM -0.042 6.014 -4.265 -4.752 -0.016 4.112 -5.942
CAM -0.001 6.021 -3.989 -4.489 -0.007 4.003 -6.045 0.886 ρ = .95
SAM -0.041 5.408 -4.004 -4.526 0.030 3.958 -6.187
IAM -0.050 6.020 -4.218 -4.696 -0.034 4.097 -5.970
Table 7: Mean Parameter Estimate Comparisons from CAM, SAM, and IAM
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p2 RMSE p4 RMSE p
B
6 RMSE p6 RMSE ρ
DGP 0.375 0.627 0.360 0.362 ρ = .05
CAM 0.375 0.035 0.628 0.012 0.358 0.017 0.361 0.016
SAM 0.352 0.092 0.659 0.052 0.348 0.049 0.373 0.040
IAM 0.382 0.034 0.623 0.011 0.361 0.017
DGP 0.206 0.697 0.336 0.362 ρ = .35
CAM 0.195 0.059 0.706 0.035 0.330 0.021 0.360 0.012
SAM 0.184 0.093 0.729 0.067 0.309 0.062 0.355 0.038
IAM 0.310 0.108 0.638 0.060 0.364 0.018
DGP 0.023 0.865 0.260 0.362 ρ = .65
CAM 0.031 0.026 0.858 0.039 0.261 0.028 0.359 0.010
SAM 0.094 0.100 0.786 0.100 0.285 0.065 0.350 0.041
IAM 0.279 0.257 0.644 0.221 0.366 0.018
DGP 0.129 0.762 0.311 0.362 ρ = .95
CAM 0.117 0.056 0.776 0.042 0.303 0.027 0.362 0.011
SAM 0.162 0.089 0.739 0.060 0.309 0.050 0.357 0.035
IAM 0.316 0.189 0.636 0.126 0.368 0.018
Table 8: Mean Probability Estimate and RMSE Comparisons from CAM, SAM, and IAM
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Figure 1: Two-Player Signalling Game
51
Figure 2: Lewis and Schultz Model of Crisis Bargaining
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Figure 3: Estimated Probabilities of Resist, ACQ, and Belief Updating
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Figure 4: Action Probabilities as a Function of ρ
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